Optimal mechanism

Results: 68



#Item
31Probability distributions / Statistical theory / Bayesian statistics / Bayesian inference / Statistical forecasting / Statistical inference / Principle of maximum entropy / Dirichlet distribution / Mechanism design / XK / Multinomial distribution / Normal distribution

Non-Bayesian Optimal Search and Dynamic Implementation Alex Gershkov and Benny Moldovanu January 22, 2009 Abstract

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Source URL: www.econ2.uni-bonn.de

Language: English - Date: 2014-03-26 06:49:17
32Mechanism design / Auction theory / Game theory / Auctions / Vickrey auction / Sampling / Auction / Sponsored search auction / Virtual valuation / Random-sampling mechanism / Prior-independent mechanism

CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #6: Simple Near-Optimal Auctions∗ Tim Roughgarden† October 9,

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2015-09-22 16:30:12
33Auction theory / Game theory / Auctions / Mechanism design / Vickrey auction / Auction / Expected value / Gaming / Probability distribution

Lower Bounds on Revenue of Approximately Optimal Auctions Balasubramanian Sivan1? , Vasilis Syrgkanis2 ??

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Source URL: people.hss.caltech.edu

Language: English - Date: 2012-10-01 03:28:30
34Mathematical analysis / Probability / Statistics / Probability distributions / Mechanism design / Game theory / Auction theory / Pareto distribution / Expected value / Valuation / Cumulative distribution function / Bayesian-optimal pricing

A lower bound on seller revenue in single buyer monopoly auctions Omer Tamuz∗ October 7, 2013 Abstract We consider a monopoly seller who optimally auctions a single object to a single potential

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Source URL: people.hss.caltech.edu

Language: English - Date: 2013-10-07 08:34:37
35Game theory / Mechanism design / Marketing / Auctions / Decision theory / Auction theory / Optimal mechanism / Profit / VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism / VickreyClarkeGroves auction / Bitcoin / Online advertising

Speaker: Susan Athey (Stanford) Title: The economics of crypto-currencies Abstract: This presentation takes an early look at the economics of Bitcoin and alternative cryptocurrencies, with a focus on raising open questio

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Source URL: www.sigecom.org

Language: English - Date: 2014-05-23 12:27:48
36

Behavioral Mechanism Design: Optimal Crowdsourcing Contracts and Prospect Theory David Easley, Cornell University Arpita Ghosh, Cornell University Incentive design is more likely to elicit desired outcomes when it is de

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Source URL: www.arpitaghosh.com

Language: English - Date: 2015-04-28 16:42:44
    37

    The Complexity of Simplicity in Mechanism Design AVIAD RUBINSTEIN UC Berkeley Optimal mechanisms are often prohibitively complicated, leading to serious obstacles both in theory and in bridging theory and practice. Consi

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    Source URL: www.sigecom.org

    Language: English - Date: 2016-01-21 12:12:47
      38

      A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer MOSHE BABAIOFF Microsoft Research and NICOLE IMMORLICA

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      Source URL: www.sigecom.org

      Language: English - Date: 2014-12-16 17:33:27
        39

        Behavioral Mechanism Design: Optimal Crowdsourcing Contracts and Prospect Theory DAVID EASLEY and ARPITA GHOSH Cornell University Incentives are more likely to elicit desired outcomes when they are based on accurate mod

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        Source URL: www.sigecom.org

        Language: English - Date: 2015-07-13 06:51:51
          40

          Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design: Motivation, Examples, and Lessons Learned TIM ROUGHGARDEN Stanford University This survey describes the approximately optimal mechanism design paradigm and uses it to investigate

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          Source URL: sigecom.org

          Language: English - Date: 2014-12-16 17:33:19
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