Optimal mechanism

Results: 68



#Item
31Non-Bayesian Optimal Search and Dynamic Implementation Alex Gershkov and Benny Moldovanu January 22, 2009  Abstract

Non-Bayesian Optimal Search and Dynamic Implementation Alex Gershkov and Benny Moldovanu January 22, 2009 Abstract

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Source URL: www.econ2.uni-bonn.de

Language: English - Date: 2014-03-26 06:49:17
32CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #6: Simple Near-Optimal Auctions∗ Tim Roughgarden† October 9,

CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #6: Simple Near-Optimal Auctions∗ Tim Roughgarden† October 9,

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2015-09-22 16:30:12
33Lower Bounds on Revenue of Approximately Optimal Auctions Balasubramanian Sivan1? , Vasilis Syrgkanis2 ??

Lower Bounds on Revenue of Approximately Optimal Auctions Balasubramanian Sivan1? , Vasilis Syrgkanis2 ??

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Source URL: people.hss.caltech.edu

Language: English - Date: 2012-10-01 03:28:30
34A lower bound on seller revenue in single buyer monopoly auctions Omer Tamuz∗ October 7, 2013 Abstract We consider a monopoly seller who optimally auctions a single object to a single potential

A lower bound on seller revenue in single buyer monopoly auctions Omer Tamuz∗ October 7, 2013 Abstract We consider a monopoly seller who optimally auctions a single object to a single potential

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Source URL: people.hss.caltech.edu

Language: English - Date: 2013-10-07 08:34:37
35Speaker: Susan Athey (Stanford) Title: The economics of crypto-currencies Abstract: This presentation takes an early look at the economics of Bitcoin and alternative cryptocurrencies, with a focus on raising open questio

Speaker: Susan Athey (Stanford) Title: The economics of crypto-currencies Abstract: This presentation takes an early look at the economics of Bitcoin and alternative cryptocurrencies, with a focus on raising open questio

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Source URL: www.sigecom.org

Language: English - Date: 2014-05-23 12:27:48
36Behavioral Mechanism Design: Optimal Crowdsourcing Contracts and Prospect Theory David Easley, Cornell University Arpita Ghosh, Cornell University  Incentive design is more likely to elicit desired outcomes when it is de

Behavioral Mechanism Design: Optimal Crowdsourcing Contracts and Prospect Theory David Easley, Cornell University Arpita Ghosh, Cornell University Incentive design is more likely to elicit desired outcomes when it is de

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Source URL: www.arpitaghosh.com

Language: English - Date: 2015-04-28 16:42:44
    37The Complexity of Simplicity in Mechanism Design AVIAD RUBINSTEIN UC Berkeley Optimal mechanisms are often prohibitively complicated, leading to serious obstacles both in theory and in bridging theory and practice. Consi

    The Complexity of Simplicity in Mechanism Design AVIAD RUBINSTEIN UC Berkeley Optimal mechanisms are often prohibitively complicated, leading to serious obstacles both in theory and in bridging theory and practice. Consi

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    Source URL: www.sigecom.org

    Language: English - Date: 2016-01-21 12:12:47
      38A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer MOSHE BABAIOFF Microsoft Research and NICOLE IMMORLICA

      A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer MOSHE BABAIOFF Microsoft Research and NICOLE IMMORLICA

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      Source URL: www.sigecom.org

      Language: English - Date: 2014-12-16 17:33:27
        39Behavioral Mechanism Design: Optimal Crowdsourcing Contracts and Prospect Theory DAVID EASLEY and ARPITA GHOSH Cornell University  Incentives are more likely to elicit desired outcomes when they are based on accurate mod

        Behavioral Mechanism Design: Optimal Crowdsourcing Contracts and Prospect Theory DAVID EASLEY and ARPITA GHOSH Cornell University Incentives are more likely to elicit desired outcomes when they are based on accurate mod

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        Source URL: www.sigecom.org

        Language: English - Date: 2015-07-13 06:51:51
          40Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design: Motivation, Examples, and Lessons Learned TIM ROUGHGARDEN Stanford University  This survey describes the approximately optimal mechanism design paradigm and uses it to investigate

          Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design: Motivation, Examples, and Lessons Learned TIM ROUGHGARDEN Stanford University This survey describes the approximately optimal mechanism design paradigm and uses it to investigate

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          Source URL: sigecom.org

          Language: English - Date: 2014-12-16 17:33:19